Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1997

J. Rodney Dansie v. Hi-Country Estates
Homeowners Association : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
A. Howard Lundgren; Keller .
George A. Hunt; Williams .
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Dansie v. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association, No. 970517 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1041

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UUUUIVIcni

BRIEF

KFU
45.9
.S9

DOCKET NO. ,.^7Q5i 7

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
J. RODNEY DANSIE,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Appeal No. 970517
vs.

HI-COUNTRY ESTATE
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, a
Utah non-profit corporation,

Argument Priority 15

Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
Appeal from a Decision of the Third Judicial District Court,
Salt Lake County, The Honorable Pat B. Brian
A. Howard Lundgren, #2022
KELLER & LUNDGREN, L.C.
257 East 200 South, Suite 340
Mailbox 10
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282

George A. Hunt, #1586
WILLIAMS & HUNT
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678
Telephone: (801) 521-5678
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

Sheleigh A. Chalkley, #5929
257 East 200 South, Suite 340
Mailbox 10
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
S'iMI

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
J. RODNEY DANSIE,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Appeal No. 970517
vs.
HI-COUNTRY ESTATE
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, a
Utah non-profit corporation,

Argument Priority 15

Defendant/Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
Appeal from a Decision of the Third Judicial District Court,
Salt Lake County, The Honorable Pat B. Brian
A. Howard Lundgren, #2022
KELLER & LUNDGREN, L.C.
257 East 200 South, Suite 340
Mailbox 10
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282

George A. Hunt, #1586
WILLIAMS & HUNT
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678
Telephone: (801) 521-5678
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

Sheleigh A. Chalkley, #5929
257 East 200 South, Suite 340
Mailbox 10
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

9

ARGUMENT

11

POINT I

11

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
THEWESTERLY 40 ACRE PARCEL WAS MADE SUBJECT
TO THE HI-COUNTRY COVENANTS AND
RESTRICTIONS BY THE NOVEMBER 1986 QUIT CLAIM
DEED
A.
B.

C.

11

The Trial Court Correctly Ruled that
the Quit Claim is Unambiguous

12

Dansie Did Not Unilaterally Subject the
Westerly Parcel to the CC&Rs and
Bylaws

14

The Issue of Possible Extinguishment of the
Quit Claim Deed Should Not be addressed
by this Court

15

POINT II

16

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
DANSIE HAD ACTUAL NOTICE THAT THE HICOUNTRY COVENANTS AND RESTRICTIONS APPLIED
TO THE TWO FORTY ACRE PARCELS
A.

Dansie Fails to Cite the Governing Statute
Regarding the Effect of Recordation of
Conveyances
i

16

17

B.
C.

D.
E.

Dansie Fails to Cite Controlling Utah
Precedent

18

Dansie had actual notice of the state of his
property such that he was required to
conduct further investigation to discover the
true state of the title

19

Dansie Fails to Properly Challenge the Trial
Court's Findings of Fact

21

The Doctrine of Merger does not Operate to Extinguish the
Terms of the 1973 Contract

22

POINT III

24

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, DANSIE'S PROPERTY IS
SUBJECT TO THE PROTECTIVE COVENANTS,
CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION, AND BYLAWS OF
THE HI-COUNTRY ESTATES HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION
BASED UPON THE DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED EQUITABLE
SERVITUDE
POINT IV

24
26

THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
TO THE ASSOCIATION WAS PROPER
CONCLUSION

26
31

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

3W Partners v. Bridges. 651 A.2d 387 (Maine 1994)

25

Astill v. Clark. Case No. 970180CA, 1998 WL 175083, at *7
(Utah App. April 8, 1998)

15

Hansen v. Stichting Mayflower Recreational Fonds. 898 F.Supp 1503 (D.Utah 1995)
(citing Hartman, 596 P.2d at 656)

12

Hartman v. Potter. 596 P.2d 653 (Utah 1979)

12

Havnes v. Hunt. 85 P.2d 861 (Utah 1939)

13

Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association v. Maxfield, No. 890471 (Utah App.
Aug. 2, 1990) Unpublished Decision

27-29

Homer v. Smith. 866 P.2d 622 (Utah App. 1993)
James v. Davies. Civil No. C81-8560

12
27-29

Johnson v. Bell. 666 P.2d 308 (Utah 1983)

18-21, 31, 32

Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Assoc. 461 P.2d 290 (Utah 1969)

24

Secor v. Knight. 716 P.2d 790 (Utah 1986)

23

State v. Montoya. 937 P.2d 145 (Utah App. 1997)

24

Stubbs v. Hemmert. 567 P.2d 168 (Utah 1977)

23

Toland v. Corev. 24 P. 190 (Utah 1890)

21

Turner v. Hi-Countrv Homeowner's Ass'n. 910 P.2d 1223 (Utah 1996)

14, 26

STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-3 (1989)

17, 18

Utah Code Annotated, § 57-1-6

1, 17-19, 21

Utah Code. Ann. § 78-2-2-(3)(j) (1996)

1

iii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code. Ann. § 78-2-2-(3)(j) (1996).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The determinative statute in this case Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6. This statute
provides:
Every conveyance of real estate, and every instrument of writing
setting forth an agreement to convey any real estate or whereby
any real estate may be affected, to operate as notice to third
persons, shall be proved or acknowledged and certified in the
manner prescribed by this title and recorded in the office of the
recorder of the county in which such real estate is situated,
which shall be valid and binding between the parties thereto
without such proofc. acknowledgement, certification or record,
and as to all other persons who have had actual notice.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6 (emphasis added).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. J. Rodney Dansie ("Dansie") is the owner of two 40-acre parcels of real property
(the "40-acre parcels") located in southwest Salt Lake County, Utah, and individually
described as follows: The southwest quarter of the southwest quarter of section 5, township
4 south, range 2 west, Salt Lake Base and Meridian (the "westerly parcel"); and, the
southeast quarter of the southwest quarter of section 5, township 4 south, range 2 west, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian (the "easterly parcel"). Dansie's property is immediately adjacent
(to the south and west) to the Hi-Countiy Estates Phase I Subdivision (the "Subdivision").
(R. 658, 661, 662, 874, 815, 1079, 1080).
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2. The Dansie family have been residents of the Herriman area of Salt Lake County
since at least the early 1900s. (R. 102, 107, 110, 801).
3. The Hi-Countiy Estates Homeowners Association ("Association") is a Utah nonprofit corporation organized on or about January 2, 1973, for the purpose of providing the
maintenance, upkeep, and preservation of the streets, roads, and common areas within the
Subdivision, and also to include additional phases of Hi-Country Estates and the
homeowners within such additional subdivisions as may be mutually beneficial for the
Association members and homeowners of the adjoining subdivisions. The Association was
also formed to promote the health, safety and welfare of the residents within the Subdivision
and any additions thereto. (R. 119, 659, Br. of Appellants Add. Ex. H).
4. The Association is the owner of certain roads, rights of way and other common
areas and improvements located within the Subdivision. (R. 2, 20, 659).
5. The Subdivision was originally developed by Gerald H. Bagley, Charles Lewton,
and Keith Spencer beginning in or about 1970. (R. 659).
6. Dansie first met the developers of the Subdivision in or about 1970, when
construction began, and in connection with the negotiation of a Well Lease Agreement
between his father and the Hi-Country developers to provide water to the Subdivision. (R.
659, 807, 808, 837, 1036, 1037, 1038, 1051).
7. Dansie first learned of the development of the Hi-Country Estates Phase I
Subdivision in or about 1970. At that time, he observed a sign announcing the development
of this Subdivision and further spoke with area landowners regarding the sale of their
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property to a developer from Wyoming (Charles Lewton) and a Salt Lake City optometrist
(Dr. Gerald H. Bagley). (R. 659, 838, 1031).
8. At about this same time Dansie observed a sales trailer near the entrance to the
property. He also reviewed a sales brochure which described the subdivision as a private
community close to 1-15 with access controlled by an electronic gate. The brochure included
the lot sizes and their prices, and a diagram of the Subdivision master plan which depicted
his 80 acres as part of the development. He also observed that lots had been surveyed and
identified by stakes and number. (R. 659, 837,839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 845, 846,1032,1043,
1044, 1045, 1049, 1061).
9. From approximately August 1970 through 1985, Dansie used Hi-Country Road
in the Subdivision on a regular and almost daily basis to develop and maintain a water
system for the Subdivision. Dansie completed this work at the request of and under the
employ of the developers of this project, and particularly Gerald H. Bagley. (R. 659, 660,
852-859, 928, 929, 1052-1059, 1062, 1064, 1068).
10.

In the early 1970s, Dansie observed the construction of stone walls or

monuments approximately eight to ten feet tall identifying the entrance to the Subdivision.
The electronic control gate at the entrance to the Subdivision was attached to these stone
walls at a later date. (R. 659, 660, 848, 849).
11. In or about 1973, Dansie became acquainted with the project manager and sales
staff at the Subdivision, namely John Cavanaugh Thomas and Shirleen James. At that time,
Mr. Thomas was the primary sales agent for the Subdivision and the project manager of the
development. Ms. James was the sales secretary. Dansie worked with Mr. Thomas in
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connection with the maintenance and development of the Subdivision water system from this
time until approximately 1985. (R. 660, 838, 839, 846, 849, 850, 851, 1046-1049).
12. On or about December 25, 1973, pursuant to a real estate contract ("1973
Contract"), Dansie's predecessor in interest, Gerald H. Bagley, as buyer, purchased from HiCountry Estates Second and Charles Lewton, certain property adjacent to the Subdivision,
including Dansie's 80 acres of real property. (R. 144, 145, 146, 660).
13. Pursuant to this contract, Hi-Country Estates Second and Lewton granted to Dr.
Bagley and his assigns the right to use the Association's roads for ingress and egress to the
property. (R. 131, 144, 145, 146, 660).
14. Also pursuant to the contract, Bagley was required to become a member of the
Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association and pay his proportionate share of costs for
maintenance of roads and services rendered by the Association in accordance with the
Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of the Association. (R. 131, 144, 145, 146, 660).
15. The terms of the 1973 Contract specifically applied to and bound the heirs,
executors, administrators, successors, and assigns of the respective parties. (R. 131,144,145,
146,660).
16. The 1973 Contract was never recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County
Recorder's Office. (R. 661).
17. In approximately 1978, Dansie assumed full responsibility for the Subdivision
water system with the exception of billing duties. He performed these tasks as a contractor
employed by Dr. Bagley. (R. 661, 812, 813, 1068, 1069).
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18. In 1978, Dansie was present and participated with Dr. Bagley, John Thomas and
Dee Halverson (an employee of Bagley & Company), on the westerly 40-acre parcel for the
purpose of placing a 40,000 gallon water tank to serve the Subdivision. The development
of this parcel of property was discussed in the presence of Mr. Dansie at this time. This
westerly parcel of property had already been surveyed into eight five-acre lots. (R. 661,856859, 921-924, 926, 927, 1058, 1059).
19. From August 1970 through the present, Dansie has observed and been aware of
the development and construction of the Subdivision. (R. 659, 661, 807, 808, 837, 1031,
1032, 1033, 1034, 1035, 1036, 1037, 1038, 1040, 1051).
20. The Association acquired its interest in the Subdivision property from Zions First
National Bank by Quit Claim Deed dated September 25, 1975. (R. 58, 661, 646, 647).
21. Zions First National Bank conveyed the westerly parcel of Mr. Dansie's 80 acres
to Gerald H. Bagley by Special Warranty Deed on March 12, 1977. (R. 59, 661, 646, 647).
22. Dansie acquired his interest in the westerly parcel of property from Gerald H.
Bagley by Warranty Deed dated November 18, 1985. (R. 60, 661, 814, 815, 834).
23. Pursuant to a Quit Claim Deed dated November 13, 1986, Dansie conveyed his
interest in the westerly parcel of property to himself and his then wife, Adrian. (R. 147,
662).
24. This Quit Claim Deed subjected the westerly 40-acre parcel of property to
"covenants, conditions and restrictions on Hi-Country Estates, as recorded in Book 3541,
page 68, Entry No. 2607748, official records, and the rules and regulations of the Hi-Country
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Estates Homeowners Association.

ALSO SUBJECT TO restrictions, rights of way and

easements appearing of record or enforceable in law and equity." (R. 147, 662).
25. As a result of this language, the westerly 40-acre parcel of property was subjected
to the Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association Protective Covenants, Certificate of
Incorporation and Bylaws and Dansie is a member of the Association. (R. 147, 649, 650,
651, 652, 658, 662, 668, 669, 739, 740, 759, 760).
26. Prior to conveying the westerly parcel to Dansie, Bagley had executed a trust
deed in favor of United Bank. (R. 62; Br. of Appellant Add. Ex. C).
27. On Bagley's failure to pay amounts due to United Bank, the successor trustee
foreclosed on the westerly parcel in February 1989 and sold the property to Fidelity National
Insurance Co. (R. 65-67; Br. of Appellant Add. Ex. C, R. 103).
28. The westerly parcel was then purchased by Dansie's father-in-law and mother-inlaw, Paul and Ida Evans, on or about March 17, 1989. Dansie acted as their agent in this
transaction. (R. 68, 825, 826, 827, 1089, 1090, 1091, 1092, 1095).
29. On or about January 1, 1993, Dansie reacquired the westerly parcel from his inlaws. (R. 69, 1096, 1097, 1098).
30. Dansie's easterly 40-acre parcel of property was acquired by him on May 22,
1989, from Ralph Marsh and the law firm of Backman, Clark and Marsh. At the time of
this conveyance and prior thereto, Dansie knew that Mr. Marsh was an attorney
representing Dr. Bagley in connection with the development of the Subdivision. (R. 662,
815, 862, 1073).
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31. The 1989 Warranty Deed from Backman, Clark and Marsh to Dansie does not
contain any reservation or reference to an encumbrance orrightto assess on behalf of the
Association. (R. 662).
32. Dansie has been on notice of the Association's Protective Covenants, Certificate
of Incorporation and Bylaws by virtue of his ownership of lots 43 and 51 within the
Subdivision, and, therefore, his membership in the Association. (R. 131, 624, 662, 828).
33. Dansie acquired his interest in Lot 51 in 1984, and his interest in Lot 43 in or
about November 1985. He acquired his interest in Lot 43 from Dr. Bagley. (R. 663, 814,
1025, 1026, 1027).
34. The roadways within the Subdivision provide the only reasonable means of
ingress and egress to Dansie's 80 acres. (R. 663).
35. The primary access road through the Subdivision (Hi-Countiy Road) was located
in approximately the same location prior to development of the Subdivision. It did not
extend to Mr. Dansie's 80 acres until it was extended by the developers and the
Homeowners Association in the mid-1970s. (R. 663, 892, 917, 918).
36. In or about 1990, the Association began to assess Dansie's 80 acres for annual
and special assessments of the Association. At that time, Dansie again acted as the Evans'
agent to deal with the assessment issue. (R. 148, 223-244, 826, 827, 828, 829).
37. On or about November 26,1991, Backman-Stewart Title Services, Ltd., paid the
1991 Association assessment, gate repair fee, plus interest and penalties on behalf of Dansie.
This payment was made under protest. (R. 148, 663).
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38. Dansie knew the developers intended to develop his 80 acres as an addition to
the Subdivision and he performed percolation tests at the request of Dr. Bagley on both the
westerly and easterly parcels in connection with this planned development prior to his
acquiring an interest in them. (R. 663, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 1098, 1099).
39. In or about February 1992, Dansie informed an appraiser, Edward P. Westra,
that he knew of Gerald H. Bagley's intent to subdivide and develop the westerly parcel.
(R. 644, 663, 887, 888).
40. Dansie was present with his father in 1973 when John Thomas informed them
that the Protective Covenants, Certificate of Incorporation, and Bylaws of the Association
applied to and bound the 80 acres which Dansie subsequently obtained. (R. 929, 931).
41. Pursuant to Article XI of the Association Bylaws, the Association is authorized
to bring an action at law to collect unpaid assessments and to recover interest, costs and
reasonable attorney's fees of this collection action. (R. 85, 663, 941, 942).
42. Dansie's 80 acre parcels benefit and their value is enhanced from the use of the
Association roads, control gate and other common areas and amenities throughout the
Subdivision. (R. 664).
43. Dansie does not presently receive certain services from the Association including
water service or garbage pickup in connection with his 80 acres of property.

The

Association does not presently assess Dansie for any charges in connection with water
service or garbage pickup. (R. 664).
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44.

In the event Dansie chooses to develop his 80 acres of property, this

development will increase the burden upon the Association roads, common areas, electronic
control gate and other amenities. (R. 664).
45. Dansie had actual notice of the developers' plans to develop and subdivide his
80 acres and actual notice of the Association's Protective Covenants, Certificate of
Incorporation and Bylaws and their application to his property. (R. 664, 665, 927, 928).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
There are essentially two issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court correctly
interpreted the November 1986 Quit-Claim Deed, and (2) whether the trial court erred in
concluding that Dansie had actual notice of possible encumbrances upon his two 40-acre
parcels prior to purchase such that he should have investigated further.

If he had

investigated further, the trial court found, he would have discovered that the 40-acre parcels
were subject to the Association's covenants, restrictions, and Bylaws.
Thefirstissue, interpretation of the Quit-Claim Deed, is a question of law which this
Court will review de novo. It is the Association's position that time-honored rules of deed
construction in Utah require that the Quit-Claim Deed be interpreted to mean that all
parcels of property referred to in the granting clause be limited by restrictions in the
habendum clause, unless the deed expressly states a contrary intent.

Under this

interpretation, because the habendum clause is silent, the westerly parcel was subjected by
the Quit-claim Deed to the Association's covenants, restrictions, and Bylaws.
The second issue is whether the trial court correctly ruled that Dansie had "actual
notice" that the Association's covenants, restrictions, and Bylaws applied to the two 40-acre
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parcels. The Association submits that it would be difficult to find a case with more facts
indicating that a purchaser of land had knowledge that his land was subject to
encumbrances. Dansie was intimately familiar with the development of the Subdivision, and
had in fact participated heavily in it. Additionally, he had spoken extensively with the
developers, and had seen plans indicating that the 40-acre parcels would be part of the
Subdivision. Further, Dansie had participated in initial stages of development of the 40-acre
parcels prior to purchase. Finally, and most importantly, Dansie was expressly told that the
Association's covenants, restrictions, and Bylaws applied to his future property.
At trial, Dansie essentially conceded that all these facts were true. However, he
claims that because the 1973 Contract which required him to become a member of the
Association was not recorded, he cannot be bound by it. This is simply not the case. Under
the Utah case law argued at trial, and the Utah statute under which the parties proceeded,
it is not necessary that all documents bearing upon encumbrances to title be recorded. This
may not currently be the state of the law, in light of amendments to the recording statutes,
but it was the law at trial.
In the alternative to the foregoing arguments, the Association asks this Court to
affirm the trial court based upon the doctrine of implied equitable servitude. In brief, the
theory, which was presented to the trial court on numerous occasions, is that it would be
unjust under the circumstances of this case to permit Dansie to have all the benefits of
belonging to the Association (including a gated entry, maintained streets, the regulated
development of the subdivision, and the opportunity to develop his parcels as "extensions"
of Hi-Countiy), without having to pay for these benefits.
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Finally, because the trial court did not err in concluding that Dansie is a member of
the Association, and is required to pay assessments, the Association asks that this Court
affirm the trial court's award of attorney fees. Prior case law definitively establishes that the
Association does have the right to make assessments on homeowners. These assessments
explicitly include attorney fees. Where there is an obligation for payment of assessments,
there can be an obligation for attorney fees incurred in an attempt to collect those
assessments.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
WESTERLY 40 ACRE PARCEL WAS MADE SUBJECT TO
THE HI-COUNTRY COVENANTS AND RESTRICTIONS
BY THE NOVEMBER 1986 QUIT CLAIM DEED.
Dansie contends that the trial court incorrectly determined that the November 1986
Quit Claim Deed subjected the westerly parcel to the Association's CC&Rs, Certificate of
Incorporation, and Bylaws. Dansie first argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law
in concluding that the Quit Claim Deed was unambiguous. Next, Dansie claims that even
if the Quit Claim Deed were unambiguous, Dansie could not unilaterally subject his
property to the Association's CC&Rs, Certificate of Incorporation, and Bylaws. These
arguments are both without merit. The trial court correctly interpreted the Quit Claim
Deed according to well-established guidelines, and Dansie jointly subjected his property to
the Association's CC&Rs, Certificate of Incorporation, and Bylaws.
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A. The Trial Court Correctly Ruled that the Quit Claim is Unambiguous,
It is well-settled Utah law that deeds are to be construed according to ordinary rules
of contract construction. See Homer v. Smith, 866 P.2d 622, 629 (Utah App. 1993).
Furthermore, "[i]n the absence of ambiguity, the construction of deeds is a question of law
for the court." Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1979).
In interpreting a deed, a court must keep the following in mind:
The main object in construing a deed is to ascertain the intention of the
parties, especially that of the grantor, from the language used. The
description of the property in a deed is prima facie an expression of the
intention of the grantor and the term "intention" as applied to the
construction of a deed, is to be distinguished from its usual connotation.
When so applied, it is a term of art and signifies a meaning of the
writing . . . . [T]he intention of the parties to a conveyance is open to
interpretation only when the words used are ambiguous.
Hansen v. Stichting Mayflower Recreational Fonds, 898 F.Supp 1503 (D.Utah 1995) (citing
Hartman. 596 P.2d at 656)).
All deeds have two specific sections. First, a deed contains the "granting clause"
which includes the description of the property to be conveyed by the grantor to the grantee.
In this case, the granting clause of the Quit Claim Deed states:
J. Rodney Dansie of Herriman, County of Salt Lake, State of
Utah, grantor, hereby QUIT-CLAIM to J. RODNEY DANSIE
AND ADRIAN L. DANSIE, HIS WIFE, AS JOINT
TENANTS, of Herriman, Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
grantee, for the sum of Ten Dollars, and other good and
valuable consideration
the following described
tract of land in Salt Lake County, State of Utah:
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PARCEL ONE:
The Southwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 5,
Township 4 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian.
PARCEL TWO:
ALL of Lot 43, HI-COUNTRY ESTATES, according to the
official plat thereof on file in the Office of the Salt Lake
County Recorder, State of Utah.
TOGETHER WITH a right-of-way over and across and the
private roads located within said subdivision.
The second section or portion of a deed was historically known as the "habendum
clause." In this case, the habendum clause states:
SUBJECT TO covenants, conditions, and restrictions on HICOUNTRY ESTATES, as recorded in Book 3541, Page 68,
Entry No. 2607748, Official Records, and the Rules and
Regulations of the HI-COUNTRY ESTATES Homeowner's
Association.
ALSO SUBJECT to restrictions, rights-of-way, and easements
appearing of record or enforceable in law and equity.
The purpose of a habendum clause is to curtail, limit, or qualify the entire estate
conveyed in the granting clause. See generally Haynes v. Hunt 85 P.2d 861 (Utah 1939).
When examining the interplay between these two clauses, "clauses in the deed subsequent
to the granting clause are given effect so as to curtail, limit, or qualify the estate conveyed
in the granting clause." Id. at 863 (citations omitted).
In the instant case, the granting clause of the Quit Claim Deed clearly describes two
parcels of property to be conveyed. Next, the habendum clause limits or qualifies the estate
conveyed in the granting clause. Dansie argues that the failure of the habendum clause to
13

specify the parcel in the granting clause to which it refers creates ambiguity in the deed.
To the contrary, failure to expressly dissect the granting clause means that, by default, the
habendum clause applies to the entire granting clause. After all, if Dansie meant to
accomplish something else by the habendum clause, he could have simply added the words
"PARCEL TWO IS" before "ALSO SUBJECT TO."
In light of the language used, this Court must construe the deed to reflect that both
parcels of property identified and described in the granting portion of the Quit Claim Deed
are "SUBJECT TO covenants, conditions, restrictions on Hi-Country Estates." As a result of
this limiting clause, Dansie is officially acknowledging his membership in the Hi-Country
Estates Homeowners Association by virtue of his ownership of the property described in the
deed. As a member of the Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association, he is obligated to
pay those assessments levied against him by the Association and, further, his use of his
property is restricted by the provisions of the Hi-Country Estates Protective Covenants
recorded in connection with that subdivision and as clearly set forth in the limiting clause
in this deed. See Turner v. Hi-Countiv Homeowner's Ass'n. 910 P.2d 1223 (Utah 1996).
B.

Dansie Did Not Unilaterally Subject the Westerly Parcel to the CC&Rs and Bylaws,
Dansie claims that even if the Quit Claim Deed could be construed so that the

habendum clause applies to both parcels contained in the granting clause, it would be
improper to permit him to "unilaterally" join the Association, and be subject to its benefits
and restrictions. While this is a correct general statement of the law, it ignores the fact that
the 1973 Contract, discussed below, expressly requires that the owners of the property
conveyed, which includes the Westerly Parcel, become members of the Association.
14

Accordingly, Dansie did not "unilaterally" become a member of the Association, he simply
acknowledged that purchase of the Westerly Parcel bound him to become a member. As
Dansie was enjoying the benefits of being a member of the Association, it is appropriate
that his property be subject to the obligations of belonging to the Association.
C.

The Issue of Possible Extinguishment of the Quit Claim Deed Should Not be
addressed by this Court,
Dansie also argues that after foreclosure of the United Bank Deed of Trust, the Quit

Claim Deed was eliminated from the chain of title, and any legal effect it might have had
is extinguished. This argument is not properly before the appellate court and should be
summarily rejected because Dansie has not indicated where in the record this issue was
preserved for appeal. To the best of the Association's knowledge, this issue was never
presented to the trial court. It was not raised at the summary judgment phase of this
matter, it was not discussed in Dansie's pre-trial brief, and, most importantly, it was not
raised at trial.
The time to have raised this issue would have been at the hearing prior to trial on
the Motion in Limine regarding the proper interpretation of the Quit-Claim Deed. Instead
of arguing that the Quit-Claim Deed was extinguished, and had no further legal effect,
counsel for Dansie argued only that the Quit-Claim Deed was ambiguous, and testimony was
required to clarify the interest of the grantor. (R. at 753, 754, 755, 757, 758). "'As the Utah
appellate courts have reiterated many times, we generally will not consider an issue, even
a constitutional one, which the appellant raises on appeal for thefirsttime.,M Astill v. Clark,
Case No. 970180CA, 1998 WL 175083, at *7 (Utah App. April 8,1998) (citations omitted).
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Moreover, as Dansie eventually did reacquire the property, it would be inequitable
for him to rely upon the fortuity of foreclosure to eliminate his obligation to pay for services
and amenities from which he benefits, and for which he knows he is responsible.
Finally, even if the Quit Claim were to be considered to have disappeared from the
chain of title, the Westerly Parcel would nonetheless be subject to the Association's
covenants and restrictions. As discussed in the second section of this brief, Dansie was on
abundant actual notice of the applicability of these covenants and restrictions to his property
outside Hi-Country Estates such that he should have conducted further inquiry into the
matter. If he had pursued the issue, he would have learned (if he did not in fact already
know) that the covenants and restrictions applied.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
DANSIE HAD ACTUAL NOTICE THAT THE
HI-COUNTRY COVENANTS AND RESTRICTIONS
APPLIED TO THE TWO FORTY ACRE PARCELS.
The trial court ruled that at the time Dansie purchased the two 40-acre parcels of
property he "had information or facts which would put a prudent person upon inquiry and
which, if pursued by [Dansie], would have lead [sic] to actual knowledge as to the state of
the title and the restrictions imposed by the December 25, 1975 real estate contract."
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at p. 9 H 2. The trial court also ruled that Dansie
had "actual notice" of the restrictions placed upon the property by the Hi-Countiy Protective
Covenants, Certificate of Incorporation and Bylaws. Id. at 1T 3.
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Dansie challenges these rulings on essentially two grounds—one legal, and one
factual. The legal argument advanced is that an individual held to possess "inquiry notice"
is only required to check into the recorded documents in the chain of title. Because the
Contract was not recorded, the argument goes, Dansie was not required to check into its
existence, or whether there was any sort of agreement between the Association and Dansie's
predecessors in interest regarding obligations running from the owner of the two 40-acre
parcels to the Association. As a subsidiary legal issue, Dansie argues that the trial court's
findings of fact fail to support the conclusion that he was or should have been placed on
notice to inquire about encumbrances on the property.
The factual issue presented is whether the trial court'sfindingsthat Dansie had actual
notice that the Association's restrictions and covenants were applicable to the two 40-acre
parcels were supported by the weight of the evidence.
A.

Dansie Fails to Cite the Governing Statute Regarding the Effect of Recordation of
Conveyances.
Dansie asserts that Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-3 (1989), concerning the effect of failure

to record documents pertaining to title, is the governing statute in this case. Because this
statute does not mention an "inquiry notice" or actual notice" exception to the general rule
that unrecorded documents are void as against a subsequent purchaser, Dansie contends
that these concepts have no relevance in Utah law.
This argument overlooks the fact that at the time Dansie purchased the two forty
acre parcels, an entirely different statute was in operation. U.C.A. 57-1-6 was the applicable
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statute describing the effect of recording an instrument on notice to third persons. Section
57-1-6 stated:
Every conveyance of real estate, and every instrument of writing
setting forth an agreement to convey any real estate or whereby
any real estate may be affected, to operate as notice to third
persons, shall be proved or acknowledged and certified in the
manner prescribed by this title and recorded in the office of the
recorder of the county in which such real estate is situated,
which shall be valid and binding between the parties thereto
without such proofs, acknowledgement, certification or record,
and as to all other persons who have had actual notice.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6 (emphasis added).
Dansie's argument also overlooks the fact that section 57-1-6 was specifically
identified as the controlling statute at trial, with no objection from counsel.1 R. at 775, lines
10-15. Thus, section 57-1-6 is the statute properly before this Court, and precedent
interpreting this statute supplies the rule of decision.
B.

Dansie Fails to Cite Controlling Utah Precedent
Dansie cites exclusively and extensively to case law outside of Utah in support of his

position that it is inequitable to impose unrecorded covenants and restrictions upon property
on the basis of notice. This is, no doubt, due to Dansie's incorrect assumption that section
57-3-3 controls this case, and his failure to find apposite Utah cases interpreting section 573-3.

As discussed above, the real governing statute in this case is section 57-1-6. This

statute has been dispositively interpreted by Utah courts as it relates to the facts of this case.
In Johnson v. Bell. 666 P.2d 308 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court was called
upon to interpret the "actual notice" provision of section 57-1-6 as it applied to a duty to
1

Section 57-1-6 was repealed in 1988.
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discover the existence of an unrecorded document. Greatly simplified, one of the issues
before the Court was whether a bank which was foreclosing on a trust deed had actual
notice of the fact that the property had been transferred to a third party by an unrecorded
quit claim deed.
If the Court were to have interpreted section 57-1-6 along the lines that Dansie has
suggested, the Court could have quickly and easily disposed of the issue by stating that the
quit claim deed was not recorded, and therefore could not, ipso facto, have been the type
of document regarding which an individual could ever have "actual notice." The Court did
not adopt this approach. Instead, citing Utah precedent going back to 1890, the Court
concluded there was "insufficient evidence of activity on the property at that time which
would have reasonably have alerted [the bank] to the claims of [quit claim grantees] and
which would have required its further attention." Id at 310 (emphasis added). That is,
"[tjhere was no evidence that there were any cattle upon the property at that time," "no one
lived upon the property," and the "improvements to the property by the Dansies had been
made [prior to the date of the quit claim deed]." Id.
Thus, Bell clearly stands for the proposition that an individual can have such actual
notice of the state of the property that he or she will be required to conduct further
investigation into both the recorded and unrecorded state of the title.
C.

Dansie had Actual Notice of the state of his Property such that he was Required to
Conduct Further Investigation to Discover the True State of the Title,
Dansie makes a fundamentally incorrect assumption about what knowledge he was

required to have such that his duty to inquire further about the state of the title was
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triggered. Dansie contends that he must have had actual notice regarding the existence of
the contract before he will be bound by its terms. This is incorrect. Instead, under Bell,
Dansie must merely have had actual notice that the two 40-acre parcels were likely to be
subject to the Association's restrictions to be required to make further inquiry.
Next, Dansie argues that his knowledge of construction in the Subdivision,
acquaintance with Hi-Country sales staff, review of a Hi-Country sales brochure and
knowledge of the Association Covenants and other documents were legally not sufficient to
put him on notice to inquire further about restrictions on the two 40-acre parcels. Dansie
is correct. Those findings alone would probably not suffice to impose a legal duty to inquire
further. However. Dansie has only cited about one-fifth of the facts which supported the
trial court's conclusion that Dansie had actual notice. Omitted were the findings that
Dansie met with the developers in 1970 (Finding of Fact 6); Dansie read a sale brochure
in 1970 indicating that his 40-acre parcels were part of Hi-Country Estates (Finding of Fact
7); Dansie worked with the developers to develop and maintain a water system for the
Subdivision (Finding of Fact 8); Dansie participated in placing a 40,000 gallon water tank
on the westerly parcel of property to serve the Subdivision. The fact that the westerly parcel
was subject to the Association's covenants and restrictions was discussed with Dansie at that
time. (Finding of Fact 17, R. 931); Dansie knew the westerly parcel had already been
surveyed into eight five-acre lots (Finding of Fact 17); Dansie had observed and participated
in the entire development and construction of the Subdivision (Finding of Fact 18); Dansie
testified that he knew the developers intended to develop his 80 acres and that he
performed certain percolation tests on both 40-acre parcels in contemplation of their

20

development as extensions of the Subdivision (Finding of Fact 33); Dansie testified that he
knew of Bagley's intent to subdivide and develop the westerly parcel (Finding of Fact 34).
In light of the overwhelming evidence that Dansie was intimately familiar with HiCountry Estates and its plans for the two 40-acre parcels, the trial court did not err in
concluding that he had actual notice of encumbrances or restrictions that should have caused
him to inquire further into the issue.
D.

Dansie Fails to Properly Challenge the Trial Courts Findings of Fact,
In addition, Dansie challenges the sufficiency of the trial court'sfindingsthat Dansie

had actual notice that the restrictions and covenants were applicable to his property.
Specifically, Dansie alleges, "There is, however, no evidence or factualfindingthat Dansie
had actual notice that the Hi-Country restrictions and covenants applied to or were intended
by the original developers to apply to the Dansie Property which lies outside the
Subdivision." Br. of App. at p. 24.
At this juncture, it would probably be helpful for the Court to keep in mind that
Dansie is using the term "actual notice" differently than it is used in section 57-1-6, and
subsequently interpreted in Bell and differently than the term was employed by the trial
court. "Actual notice" under section 57-1-6 means that "'a party dealing with land ha[s]
information of facts which would put a prudent man upon inquiry and which, if pursued,
would lead to actual notice as to the state of the title."' Bell 666 P.2d at 310 (quoting
Toland v. Corey. 24 P. 190 (Utah 1890)). Dansie, citing New Mexico law, asserts that
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"actual notice" means "information that was communicated directly to or received by a
party." See Br. of App. at 24.
Despite this confusion, the trial court clearly made findings that support a legal
conclusion that "actual notice" existed under both Utah law and New Mexico law. That is,
the trial court found infindings6 though 10, 16 through 18, and 22 through 40 that Dansie
had personal knowledge of a huge number of facts regarding the two 40-acre parcels that
should have led him to inquire further, and if he would have consulted the Association, he
would have learned that his property outside the subdivision was subject to the Association's
covenants and restrictions. In addition, the evidence at trial was that Dansie was told that
the covenants and restrictions applied to his property. (R. 931 Ins. 9-21). This evidence was
reflected in Finding of Fact 40, and Conclusion of Law 3.
Thus, Dansie's claim that the trial court made nofindingsregarding whether he had
"actual notice" that the restrictions and covenants were applicable to his property is without
merit, and should be rejected by this Court.
E. The Doctrine of Merger does not Operate to Extinguish the Terms of the 1973 Contract
Dansie claims that under the doctrine of merger, the terms of the 1973 Contract were
"merged into subsequent deeds conveying the property and were therefore extinguished as
a matter of law." Br. of App. at p. 24. Although Dansie correctly states the general
definition of the doctrine of merger, he does not alert this Court to the fact that there are
exceptions to this doctrine, "including fraud, mistake, and the existence of collateral rights
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in the contract of sale." Secor v. Knight 716 P.2d 790, 793 (Utah 1986); see also Stubbs v.
Hemmert. 567 P.2d 168, 169 (Utah 1977).
In this case, the "collateral rights" exception applies. The collateral rights exception
states that "if the original contract calls for performance by the seller of some act collateral
to conveyance of title, his [or her] obligations with respect thereto survive the deed and are
not extinguished by it." Secor, 716 at 793. The parties to the 1973 Contract agreed in
paragraph five that buyers "will become members of the Hi-Country Estates Homeowners
Association and pay their proportionate share of costs for maintenance of roads and services
rendered by Hi-Countiy Estates Homeowners Association in accordance with the Articles
of Incorporation and bylaws of said association." See Br. of App. at Exh. J (emphasis
added).
It is important to note that the 1973 Contract does not state that the buyers are
members of the Homeowners Association and that the Articles of Incorporation and bylaws
currently apply to the property. If that were the case, the failure of thefinaldeed to include
the restrictions on the property would be conclusive, and there would be no collateral rights
exception. However, "[w]hen . . . performance is intended by the parties to take place at
some time after the delivery of the deed it cannot be said that it was contemplated by the
parties that delivery of the deed would constitute full performance . . . absent some manifest
intent to the contrary." Stubbs. 567 P.2d at 169-70.
The 1973 Contract requires the buyers to become members of the Homeowners
Association at some point after the signing of the Contract. As such, it contemplates
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performance after the delivery of the deed, and constitutes a collateral agreement. The
Doctrine of Merger does not operate to extinguish such an obligation.
POINT III
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, DANSIE'S PROPERTY IS
SUBJECT TO THE PROTECTIVE COVENANTS,
CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION, AND BYLAWS
OF THE HI-COUNTRY ESTATES HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION
BASED UPON THE DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED EQUITABLE SERVITUDE.
It well settled that this Court may affirm the trial court's ruling on any proper ground
as long as there is evidence in the record supporting such an affirmance. State v. Montoya,
937 P.2d 145, 149 (Utah App. 1997). In Montoya, the Utah Court of Appeals relied upon
Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Assoc, 461 P.2d 290 (Utah 1969) and quoted the
Supreme Court's decision as follows:
The appellate court will affirm the judgment order or decree
appealed from it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory
apparent on the record, even though such theory or ground
differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its
ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or
theory is not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not
raised in the lower court, and was not considered or past on by
the lower court.
Id at 149.
In this case, Hi-Country argued in its opposition to Dansie's Motion to Alter or
Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment that Dansie's 80 acres of
property were subject to the rules and regulations of the Association based upon the concept
of implied equitable servitudes. In order to rely on that doctrine, the evidence must
establish five elements: (1) a common owner must subdivide property into a number of lots
for sale; (2) a common owner must have a "general scheme for development" for the
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property as a whole, in which its use will be restricted; (3) the vast majority of the lots in
the development must contain the use restrictions; (4) the property sought to be restricted
must be part of the general scheme; and (5) the purchaser (in this case, Dansie) must have
actual or constructive knowledge of the developer's intent to restrict the uses of the whole
development. 3W Partners v. Bridges, 651 A.2d 387 (Maine 1994).
Hi-Countiy met its burden and established each of these elements. First, common
owners (Dr. Bagley, Mr. Lewton, and Mr. Spencer) subdivided the property into a number
of lots for sale. The common owners had a general scheme for development of the property
as a whole in which the use of the property was to be restricted. The vast majority of the
lots in the development contain these use restrictions in the form of Protective Covenants,
and the Certificate of Incorporation and Bylaws of the Hi-Countiy Estates Homeowners
Association.
The record is clear that Dansie was aware that his two 40-acre parcels of property
were part of a general scheme and were intended to be developed by Dr. Bagley and others.
Dansie testified that he knew of these development plans and performed percolation tests
in connection with the development of both parcels of his property at the request of Dr.
Bagley. (R. 866, 1098). Furthermore, Dansie told an appraiser, Edward P. Westra, that he
knew of the developer's intent to develop and subdivide the property intofive-acrelots. (R.
887, 888). Finally, based upon all these facts, the Court specifically determined that Dansie
had actual knowledge of the developer's intent to restrict the uses of his two 40-acre parcels*
(R. 665).
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This implied equitable servitude argument is clearly in the record in both Dansie's
Memorandum to Alter or Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment (R.
679, 680, 681), and in Hi-Country's Memorandum in Opposition to this Motion. (R. 710,
711). Therefore, although the trial court did not specifically consider or pass on this
argument, it is a proper ground upon which this Court may affirm the trial court's ruling in
view of all of the evidence in the record which supports this theory.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURTS AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
TO THE ASSOCIATION WAS PROPER.
As set forth above, the trial court correctly determined that at the time Dansie
acquired his interest in the two 40-acre parcels of property, he had substantial and lengthy
knowledge of the development scheme of the Hi-Country Estates Phase I Subdivision, and
had adequate information or facts which would put a prudent person upon inquiry which,
if pursued by Dansie, would have led to his actual knowledge that the Association's
Protective Covenants, Certificate of Incorporation, and Bylaws applied to his property.
These documents imposed certain obligations upon him with regard to the payment of
assessments, compliance with the Protective Covenants, and an obligation to pay attorney's
fees and costs incurred in connection with actions filed by the Association to collect
assessments.
Dansie concedes that this Court has already determined that the Articles and Bylaws
of this Association constitute a contractual agreement between the Association and its
members. See Br. of Appellant at p. 36. See also Turner v. Hi-Country Homeowners Ass.,
910 P.2d 1223 (Utah 1996). Notwithstanding Dansie's concession, he attempts to argue that
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based upon prior decisions involving the Association (James v. Davies, Civil No. C81-8560,
attached as Add. Ex. F to Br. of Appellant and Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association
v. Maxfield (Unpublished Decision 890471-CA, attached as Add. Ex. G to Br. of Appellant)
that the Association has no authority to levy assessments, collect attorney's fees, or require
other maintenance or service fees from property owners pursuant to the terms of its
Protective Covenants. Dansie misunderstands the holding and final determination in both
of these cases.
First, in the James case, Judge Scott Daniels considered whether or not an attempted
amendment to the Hi-Country Estates Phase I Protective Covenants was valid. This
particular amendment authorized the Association to levy assessments pursuant to the terms
of the covenants. Judge Daniels found that the Association's basic set of covenants were
executed on or about June 15, 1970. Subsequent to that date, an amendment was made on
or about April 6, 1973. However, as Judge Daniels further found, the original set of
covenants executed on June 15,1970, by their terms, prohibited any amendment for a period
of 25 years after their initial execution.
Judge Daniels determined, therefore, that the plaintiffs in that case were entitled to
a judgment declaring that any amendments which occurred sooner than 25 years after June
15,1970, were improperly enacted and, therefore, void. Judge Daniels did not rule that the
inclusion of a provision regarding the levying of assessments in the Protective Covenants was
improper. In fact, the Court specifically determined that the Association was entitled to a
judgment declaring that the original June 15,1970, Protective Covenants were not vague or
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ambiguous and do, in fact, constitute a present and continuing servitude on property within
the Hi-Country Estates Phase I Subdivision.
Dansie then argues that because the James case was not appealed, it is res judicata
as to the issue of whether or not the Association is authorized to levy assessments pursuant
to the provisions of its Protective Covenants. To support this proposition, Dansie cites HiCountry Estates Homeowners Association v. Maxfield, No. 890471 (Utah App. Aug. 2,
1990), an unpublished opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals. (A copy of this opinion is
attached as Br. of Appellant, Ex. G). Dansie misreads this opinion. In that case, the Court
of Appeals discussed Maxfield's challenge of the trial court's determination that he was
obligated to pay assessments to the Association based upon the doctrine of res judicata and,
specifically, Maxfield's claim that James was a bar to the Association's action to recover any
unpaid assessments.
In rejecting Maxfield's argument, the Court of Appeals discussed the doctrine of res
judicata and its two distinct components known as claim preclusion and issue preclusion.
The Court of Appeals then determined that the trial court had correctly ruled that the
second requirement for claim preclusion had not been satisfied. Judge Jackson states:
It is clear from the case record of James v. Davies, that the
parties did not litigate, and Judge Daniels did not rule upon,
the Association's authority to levy and coDect assessments from
Maxfield and other subdivision property owners. . . . It is true
that the prior decision in James invalidated the amendment to
the subdivision's Protective Covenants.
However, the
Association does not base its assessment authority or its current
cause of action for unpaid assessments on the invalidated
amendment, but rather on the Articles of the Association,
which are binding on Maxfield as an Association member since
he took his property subject to them. Notwithstanding
Maxfield's attempt to rewrite the history of the prior litigation.
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the James court did not conclude either that the Association
had no basis for levying and collecting assessments, or that
Maxfield was not a mandatory member of the Association.
Those issues simply were not before the James court, although
Maxfield could have raised them.
Maxfield. No. 890471 at *4 (emphasis added).
Therefore, Dansie's argument that James and Maxfield precluded the Association
levying assessments, or recovering attorney's fees from him isflatlyincorrect. The trial court
specifically determined the Association's Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions apply to
and restrict the use of Dansie's 80 acres, and that Dansie is a member of the Association.
Accordingly, Dansie, must comply with the provisions of these rules.
The specific provisions of the Association's Certificate of Incorporation which relate
to the authority and power of the Association state as follows:
Third: This Association is not organized for pecuniary profit or
gain to the members thereof, and the specific purposes for
which it is formed are to provide for maintenance, upkeep, and
preservation of the streets, roads, and common area within that
certain tract of property described as: Hi-Country Estates,
located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Phase I. And also
to include additional phases of Hi-County Estates and the
homeowners located within such additional subdivisions as may
be mutually beneficial for the members hereof and the
homeowners of the adjoining subdivisions. The Association is
also formed to promote the health, safety, and welfare of the
residents within Hi-Country Estates, and any additions thereto
as may hereafter be brought within the jurisdiction of this
Association for this purpose to: . . .
(b) fix, levy, collect, and enforce payment by any lawful means,
all charges or assessments pursuant to the terms of the
Protective Covenants, as amended, and as provided in the
Bylaws adopted by the Association;. . . .
See Br. of Appellant, Add. Ex. H.
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Article XI of the Association Bylaws states:
As more fully provided in the Protective Covenants, as
amended, each member is obligated to pay the Association
annual and special assessments which are secured by a
continuing lien upon the property against which the assessment
is made. Any assessments which are not paid when due, shall
be delinquent. If the assessment is not paid within 30 days
after the due date, the assessment shall bear interest from the
date of delinquency at the rate of 1.5% per month, and the
Association may bring an action at law against the owner
personally obligated to pay the same or foreclose the lien
against the property, and interest, costs, and reasonable
attorney's fees of any such action shall be added to the amount
of such assessment. No owner may waive or otherwise escape
liability for the assessment provided for herein by nonuse of the
common area, roads, or abandonment of his lot. (emphasis
added).
See Br. of Appellant, Add. Ex. I.
Clearly, the provisions of the Association's Bylaws specifically authorize the collection
of attorney's fees if the Association is required to bring an action against a property owner
to pay assessments properly levied by the Association against the landowner. In this case,
the Association asserted a counterclaim against Mr. Dansie specifically seeking an award of
all assessments it had levied against Mr. Dansie's property commencing in 1992. The
Association was successful in the trial court in obtaining an Order and Judgment awarding
it the sum of $5,601.30 representing annual and special assessments for his two 40-acre
parcels together with penalties and interest totalling $2,335.68 for the period January 1,
1992, through March 31,1997. The Court also awarded interest on this judgment at the rate
of 18% percent per annum. Finally, the Court correctly determined that the Association
was entitled to be awarded its reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection
with the collection of the assessments through April 10, 1997, in the amount of $32,796.45,
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together with interest at 18% per annum from October 1, 1997, until paid, and "after
incurred attorney's fees and costs association with the collection of this judgment."
In view of Mr. Dansie's clear actual knowledge of the restrictions imposed upon his
property by the original developers of Hi-Country Estates Phase I, his specific knowledge
of the existence of the Association's Protective Covenants, Certificate of Incorporation and
Bylaws, and his knowledge that these Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions effected and
applied to his 80 acres of property, the Association is clearly entitled to recover not only all
assessments and interest which have remained unpaid through April 10, 1997, but also the
attorney's fees it has incurred in connection with this appeal, including all after-incurred
attorney's fees associated with the collection of the Court's judgment.2 Therefore, this Court
should affirm the trial court's Amended Order and Judgment and Order awarding attorney's
fees in this action and, further, should award the Association its attorney's fees associated
with responding to and defending this appeal as a part of the continuing action to recover
assessments from Dansie.
CONCLUSION
This case is probably the last case in which this Court will be asked to apply repealed
section 57-1-6, and the case law interpreting it. It is unclear whether Bell's pronouncement

2

Dansie argues that the Association's Certificate of Incorporation does not
contemplate that an owner of land adjoining the Subdivision could be a "member"
subject to assessments. However, the very language of the Certificate of Incorporation
cited by Dansie undercuts his position. It clearly states that any owner of a lot subject to
assessment is a member. Further, the Certificate of Incorporation expressly envisions
that the Association will include members beyond the confines of Hi-Countiy Estates
Subdivision Phase I. See Certificate of Incorporation of Hi-Country Estates
Homeowners Association, attached as Ex. H to Br. of Appellant.
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that a purchaser of real property can be bound by the terms of unrecorded documents would
be good law today. However, it was good law at the time of trial, and both parties
presented their cases under its aegis.
The trial court correctly applied Bell and ruled that Dansie had abundant "actual
notice" of activity on his 40-acre parcels such that he should have inquired further and
discovered the existence of the 1973 contract which bound him to become a member of the
Association. His actual knowledge of the encumbrances of his 40-acres parcels is further
reflected in his creation of a Quit-Claim Deed expressly subjecting one of his parcels to the
covenants and restrictions of the Association.
Under all of the circumstances of this case, it would be unjust to permit Dansie to
reap all of the benefits of membership in the Association, without paying his dues. The trial
court's rulings should be affirmed, including the provision for attorney fees. Finally, the
Association should be awarded fees on appeal on the same grounds as fees were awarded
below.
DATED this jt>

day of May, 1998.

LUNDGREN
Attorney for Appellees
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